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AUSTRALIAN INSOLVENCY LAW AND THE 1992 ISDA 
MASTER AGREEMENT—CATALYST, REACTION, AND 
SOLUTION 
Christopher J. Mertens† 
Abstract: The reverberations of Enron’s financial collapse were heard on an 
international scale.  Indeed, Enron Australia’s liquidation set off a flood of concern and 
speculation about the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s (“ISDA”) model 
documentation for derivative transactions.  A December 2003 opinion of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales exposed a flaw in the ISDA 1992 Master Agreement.  Two 
provisions of the agreement operate in tandem, creating a result which operates contrary 
to the clear meaning of the terms.  This volatile interaction of the provisions effectively 
shifts the risk from the parties to the swap contract to the creditors of the defaulting party.  
This unexpected result poses a real concern for the creditors of parties to swap or 
derivative instruments governed by the 1992 Master Agreement.  The ISDA has 
articulated policy goals to maintain market stability and efficiency.  As the drafter of the 
model agreements, the ISDA has an ethical obligation to ensure that the terms of the 
agreement operate according to their clear meaning.  Otherwise, the parties can best 
address the Agreement’s deficiencies by taking notice and contracting around them. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2003, the Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
Australia, decided a case involving the rights of an insolvent party under an 
electricity swap contract.1  The court held in that case, Enron Australia 
Finance Pty Ltd v. TXU Electricity Ltd, that it did not have authority under 
Australian insolvency law 2 to alter the terms of the swap contract to force 
the non-insolvent party, TXU Electricity (“TXU”), to pay the net amount 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal editorial staff, Mr. Jay 
Lardizabal for introducing me to the case, and Professor Sean O’Connor for his instructive comments.  
Furthermore, the author thanks all of his friends and family for their love and support.    
1
  Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266 (N.S.W.).  An 
electricity swap contract is an agreement between two parties where one party agrees to pay the market rate 
and the other agrees to pay a fixed rate over the period of the agreement.  Periodically, as agreed to by the 
parties, the difference between the market rate and the fixed rate is paid to the party owed.  See INT’L 
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html.  Parties generally enter into a number of such agreements, or 
“confirmations,” under the overarching non-economic terms of the Master Agreement.  See infra Part II. 
2
  Australian insolvency law with respect to corporations is codified in Chapter Five of the 
Corporations Act, 2001.  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5. 
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owed in the event that TXU chose to terminate the agreement.3  The New 
South Wales Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision in full.4 
Under the court’s interpretation of Australian corporate insolvency 
law,5 the International Swap and Derivative Association’s (“ISDA”) 1992 
Master Agreement (“Master Agreement”) 6 effectively allows TXU to walk 
away from the contract,7 despite the fact that the parties elected a provision 
that disallows them to walk away from their obligation.8  The outcome of the 
case exposed terms in the Master Agreement that interact to operate contrary 
to the plain meaning.9  The risk of loss that TXU assumed under the Master 
Agreement was transferred to the creditors of Enron Australia in liquidation, 
depriving them of the value from the Master Agreement and relieving TXU 
of any potential payment obligation.10  In order to reduce the potential for 
systemic collapse, give effect to the Master Agreement’s terms as written, 
and remain consistent with the ISDA’s underlying policy goals, there must 
be some mechanism to provide for the Master Agreement’s termination.11 
Those involved in derivatives markets in which courts can determine 
the enforceability of contractual provisions under insolvency and bankruptcy 
laws 12 have noticed the Enron Australia decision.13  This case is significant 
                                           
3
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 77.  For an explanation of close-out netting, see infra 
Part II.A.   
4
  Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd, (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12. 
5
  See infra Part IV. 
6
  International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 1992 Master Agreement (Multicurrency – Cross 
Border) [hereinafter 1992 Agreement]; see discussion of the ISDA’s background infra Part II. 
7
  Gary Walker & Guy Usher, Good Law—Serious Implications: Enron Australia v. TXU Electricity, 
19 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 414, 415 (2004); see infra Part IV. 
8
  By selecting the Second Method, and not selecting the First Method, both parties implicitly agreed 
that walking away would not be an option for the defaulting parties; see discussion infra Part V.B. 
9
  See infra Part V.B. 
10
  See infra Part IV.C. 
11
  See infra Part V.B.  
12
  Courts that traditionally have the power to determine and alter the enforceability of contracts in 
the event of insolvency are located within countries with historic ties to English bankruptcy law, including 
England, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. 
13
  See, e.g., Bad News for Insolvent Counterparties – 1½ Way Payments Under ISDA Master 
Agreement?, ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON, FOCUS: BANKING AND FIN., Feb. 2004, available at 
http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/baf/fobaffeb04.htm [hereinafter AAR] (discussing the consequences of the 
case from an Australian perspective); Robert Scavone et al., Some Further Thoughts on Enron Australia v. 
TXU: Putting the ISDA “Flawed Assets” Clause in Perspective, MCMILLAN BINCH, DERIVATIVES BULL., 
Dec. 2004, available at http://www.mcmillanbinch.com/Upload/Publication/enron%20v%20 
australia%201204.pdf [hereinafter MCMILLAN BINCH] (discussing the potential outcome and significance 
of the case under Canadian Law); Jeremy D. Weinstein, et al., Escape From the Island of the One-Way 
Termination: Expectations and Enron v. TXU, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2004, at 1 
(discussing the potential outcome and significance of the decision under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); 
Jeremy Carter, FSA Asks Bank of England to Review Aussie Ruling, DERIVATIVES WEEK, July 23, 2004, 
available at http://www.derivativesweek.com/default.asp?page=1&SID=424923&ISS=10644 (noting the 
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because end users of varying sophistication enter into derivative contracts 
both for hedging and investing purposes.14 Additionally, there is a growing 
concern regarding the obligations of private entities that draft model 
transactional documents.15  The Master Agreement’s subversive operation is 
also inconsistent with the accounting and disclosure of swap and derivative 
transactions.16 
While reactions have been varied,17 the case highlighted a potentially 
unanticipated outcome under the ISDA Master Agreement; one that leaves 
an aftertaste of inequity.  In the interests of maintaining market stability and 
the transparency of risk allocation among parties to swap contracts governed 
by the Master Agreement, the ISDA should amend the agreement to allow 
for its timely termination in the event of one party’s liquidation.  The ISDA 
has an interest, and perhaps even an obligation, to ensure that the default 
outcome under the Master Agreement is clear from the express language and 
terms, and to protect the derivative instrument as an asset in a defaulting 
party’s liquidation.  
This Comment argues that the ISDA has assumed a role of 
responsibility for the stability of the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives 
market.  It is likewise in the interest of this privately regulated multinational 
industry to maintain market stability through the clear operation of the terms 
of the Master Agreement.  The ISDA thus has both an obligation to amend, 
and interest in amending, the model documentation to provide for clear 
operation of the model agreements.  Part II provides background to the ISDA 
and select provisions of the 1992 Master Agreement.  Part III briefly 
explains a debtor’s contractual rights under Australian insolvency law.  Part 
IV examines the Enron Australia opinion and the inequitable risk transfer 
under the Master Agreement from the non-defaulting party to the defaulting 
party’s creditors.  Part V examines the potential effects of, and issues raised 
                                                                                                                              
potential and serious implications of the Enron Australia decision, and the impact on English regulatory 
law).  
14
  See, e.g., Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance 
Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1035 (1994) (noting that even school districts are utilizing 
derivatives in an effort to control financial risk); William J. Bergman et al., Netting, Financial Contracts, 
and Banks: The Economic Implications 30 (Aug. 12, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, FRB of Chicago 
Working Paper No. 2004-02), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/ 
wp2004-02.pdf (discussing the use of credit derivatives by financial institutions). 
15
   See infra Part V. 
16
  See infra Part V.B. 
17
  Compare Carter, supra note 13 (noting that the Bank of England’s Financial Markets Law 
Committee was reviewing the impact of the Enron Australia decision on regulation of capital netting for 
regulated financial institutions), with Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating that the outcome of the 
case “enforced a contract as written in a manner close enough to what must have been intended”). 
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by, this decision in comparison with the underlying purpose of the ISDA 
Master Agreement.  Part VI argues that derivative market participants should 
be made aware of the operation of the Master Agreement in the event of the 
insolvency of an in-the-money party in order to contract around the outcome 
demonstrated in Enron Australia.  The ISDA, however, is best suited, and 
perhaps obligated, to resolve any undesired outcomes under the Master 
Agreement.  
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION 
MAINTAINS MARKET STABILITY THROUGH PRIVATE REGULATION 
The ISDA is a private international regulatory corporation which 
drafts model contracts, lobbies local governments for correct rules, and 
works to maintain market stability.18  In 1992, it created the 1992 ISDA 
Master Agreement, a model agreement for parties entering into multiple 
OTC derivative transactions.19  The Master Agreement allows the parties to 
engage in a series of less-formal transactions under the Master Agreement’s 
overarching terms. 20   The Master Agreement sets forth all of the non-
economic terms of such transactions21 in order to increase the parties’ ability 
to efficiently enter into swap transactions by merely setting the economic 
terms, such as the price, amount, and period for each individual 
transaction.22 
The following is a brief introduction to four key concepts and 
provisions within the 1992 Master Agreement relevant to the ISDA’s 
regulatory ability, as it applies to the Enron Australia decision and this 
                                           
18 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MISSION STATEMENT, 
http://www.isda.org/wwa/mission.html [hereinafter ISDA Mission]; ALLEN & OVERY, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE DOCUMENTATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES: “TEN THEMES” 2 (May 2002) [hereinafter TEN THEMES], 
http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/documentation_of_derivatives.pdf.  See ALLEN & OVERY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCUMENTATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES 2-5 (May 2002), for a history of the ISDA 
generally and the progression of the model instruments thereby developed. 
19
  TEN THEMES, supra note 18.  OTC derivative transactions allow parties to more efficiently and 
easily enter into transactions to meet the changing need to hedge risks in fluctuating commodity markets 
and expected cash flows.  DIETMAR FRANZEN, DESIGN OF MASTER AGREEMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 17 
(2001).  Over-the-counter derivatives are financial instruments negotiated by the parties to the instrument, 
as opposed to listed derivatives available on an exchange.  ROBERT A. STRONG, DERIVATIVES: AN 
INTRODUCTION 5 (2002).   
20
  TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 1-2.  Each separate transaction is recorded in a written instrument 
known as a confirmation.  Id. at 2.  Each confirmation is made under the Master Agreement and together, 
they are said to constitute a single agreement, all incorporated into the Master Agreement itself.  1992 
Agreement, supra note 6, § 1(c).  
21
 FRANZEN, supra note 19, at 19; see, e.g., 1992 Agreement, supra note 6 (including procedures, 
legal terms, definitions, default conditions, etc.).  
22
 TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 2.  
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Comment.  These concepts are essential to understanding how the terms of 
the 1992 Master Agreement interact, and the variety of potential outcomes in 
the event of one party’s insolvency.  First, netting requirements are 
imperative to determining each party’s risk when entering into each 
individual transaction under the Master Agreement.  This is also significant 
to the outside creditors of the contracting parties. 23    Next, the Master 
Agreement specifies several events of default, which have two major 
implications: the non-defaulting party’s option to declare an early 
termination date, 24  and a stay of the non-defaulting party’s payment 
obligations under the Agreement 25  (also known as the “flawed-asset 
provision”).26  The parties may also include additional termination events 
that allow the parties to adapt the Master Agreement to the local 
jurisdictional laws, or to temper the consequences to an insolvent party 
under the Master Agreement.27 
A. Netting 
Netting is a key concept within both the ISDA and international 
markets as a whole.28  The Master Agreement’s netting provision allows 
each of the individual transactions entered into under the agreement to be 
treated as a single transaction.29  At the time payments are periodically due,30 
the netting provision offsets the amounts payable by each party, creating a 
net amount payable.31  A significant consequence of parties’ ability to net 
transactions arises when one of the parties has become insolvent.32  Without 
                                           
23
 See infra Part II.A.  
24
 See infra Part. II.B. (discussing the right of the non-defaulting party to close out all outstanding 
transactions upon the default of the counterparty). 
25
 See infra Part II.C. (explaining that as the periodic settling dates for the individual transactions 
come due, the non-defaulting party’s obligations are stayed due to the existing event of default, also 
referred).  
26
 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(a)(iii). 
27
 See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(b)(v); discussion infra Part II.D. 
28
 See TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4. 
29
 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 1(c). 
30
 On dates periodically specified by the parties, or as mentioned in the individual confirmations, the 
amounts owed to each party are netted together, to create one amount payable by the party that is net “out-
of-the-money” to the party that is net “in-the-money.”  See ROBERT W. KOLB, FUTURES, OPTIONS, AND 
SWAPS 702-03 (4th ED. 2003); TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4. 
31
 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(c) (stating that the parties may elect to net the aggregate 
amounts payable by each respective party across multiple transactions).  
32
 See TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4.  Insolvency for the purpose of this statement means when 
the counterparty is unable to pay the amount owed in a given transaction under the Agreement. Australian 
law defines insolvency as the inability to pay debts as they become due.  Corporations Act, 2001, pt.1.2, 
div. 7, § 95A; see JOHN DUNS, INSOLVENCY LAW AND POLICY 80-82 (Trischa Baker ed., 2002).  
238                                    PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
an enforceable netting provision, an insolvent party attempts to collect the 
amount owed to it from the non-defaulting party under one derivative 
transaction. The insolvent party is simultaneously unable to pay its 
obligation to the non-defaulting party under another transaction.33  A party’s 
financial risk is decreased by allowing the financial obligations under the 
Master Agreement to be netted. 34   Potential creditors consequently are 
willing to provide credit on more favorable terms.35  Because netting allows 
swaps to have smaller sums at risk, it permits a party entering into the 
agreement to adjust the risk exposure by smaller increments when entering 
into additional transactions.36 
The systemic implications of netting are particularly apparent in the 
event of insolvency.37  Companies within a particular industry are often 
engaged in a web of interrelated swap and derivative agreements.38  The lack 
of a netting provision may create a chain reaction of recognized losses, 
leading ultimately to systemic collapse of the particular market.39  The ISDA 
has been particularly successful in obtaining legal opinions that affirmensure 
                                           
33
  The attempt to collect amounts owed while avoiding payment of amounts owed to the 
counterparty is referred to as “cherry-picking.”  TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4.  While helping to 
maximize the amount of funds available to pay the bankrupt party’s creditors, such “cherry-picking” 
increases the risk of each party in the event of the other’s insolvency.  See id.; Waldman, supra note 14, at 
1059.  
34
  Close-out netting refers to the amount paid upon termination of all of the transactions under the 
agreement, usually as a result of bankruptcy, insolvency, or another event of default.  See discussion infra 
Part II.B.  The ISDA defines close-out netting as the combination of the credit exposure of each party to the 
agreement into one amount payable by the party that is net in-the-money.  INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES 
ASS’N, PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS NO. 30, http://www.isda.org/ 
educat/faqs.html. 
35
  See TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4.  Netting reduces the amount a party can lose in the event the 
counter-party fails to make the expected payment.  This increases the credit-worthiness of the party and 
makes credit less expensive, because the credit provider’s exposure is lessened when extending credit to the 
party.  
36
  See STRONG, supra note 19, at 319-20 (explaining that the amount at risk to a swap agreement is 
in line with the net periodic payments made between parties, and not the entire payments to be made). 
37
  Thomas J. Werlen & Sean M. Flanagan, The 2002 Model Netting Act: A Solution For Insolvency 
Uncertainty, BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L., Apr. 2002, at 154, 155-56. 
38
  See, e.g., id, at 156 (discussing the reduction of risk that netting provides to the banking and 
finance industry, which commonly has participants in a web of credit derivatives).   
39
  See Bergman, supra note 14, at 30 (recognizing that close-out netting is an effective method of 
reducing systemic risk).  In terms of regulated financial institutions, the reduction of systemic risk has been 
recognized as a justification for the right to close-out netting in the United States since the early twentieth 
century.  See id., at 11 (citing Studley v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913)).  But see Robert 
R. Bliss & George C. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout (Apr. 8, 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/files/sem_bliss 
_kaufman.pdf (arguing that it is not clear whether netting results in a reduction of systemic risk).  The gross 
amounts at risk can be much larger than the net exposure, thus creating an important reliance on ability to 
offset amounts owed when the purpose of entering into such agreements is to accurately hedge risks.  
Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 154. 
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the netting provision’s enforceability in credit derivative instruments under 
the Master Agreement.40  It has also effectively lobbied jurisdictions to pass 
statutory laws upholding contractual netting rights in the event of 
insolvency.41  The Master Agreement would have little practical effect as a 
useful risk management tool if the netting provisions were not recognized in 
the relevant jurisdiction.42  
B. Events of Default and Early Termination 
The Master Agreement specifically lists events which will result in the 
default of a party to the agreement, 43  including circumstances beyond 
traditional notions of contract breach.44  For example, section 5(a)(vii) of the 
Master Agreement dictates that an event of bankruptcy will result in 
default.45  
A defaulting party does not necessarily implicate termination of the 
Master Agreement. 46   A transaction that terminates prior to the natural 
expiration date—as contracted for in each individual transaction—due to an 
event of default or otherwise, is only subject to an early termination date.47  
The non-defaulting party may choose whether and when to set an early 
termination date.48  If the parties elect an automatic termination date upon 
                                           
40
  Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 157.  Credit derivative contracts follow the same basic 
ISDA Master Agreement structure, and are thus relevant to the present discussion.  See Bergman, supra 
note 14. 
41
  See Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 157.  The ISDA’s model legislation is not limited to the 
credit derivative market, and aims to uphold all contractual netting provisions in an effort to maintain 
market stability.  Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, 2002 Model Netting Act, pt.1, § 4.  
42
  Tamasin Little, Regulation by Non-Regulators, in ISSUES IN DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 27, 34 
(Edward J. Swan ed., 1999). 
43
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(a).  
44
  See, e.g., id. §§ 5(a)(iii)–(viii) (including merger without assumption of all obligations, and an 
event of bankruptcy, in addition to material misrepresentations). 
45
  Id. § 5(a)(vii) (also including, for example, becoming insolvent, having an administrator 
appointed, or a company becoming subject to an order of liquidation).  For the purposes of this comment, 
the discussion of events of default will be assumed to fall under an event of bankruptcy, as enumerated in 
section 5(A)(vii) of the 1992 Master Agreement, particularly (5), there under, which states, “has a 
resolution passed for its winding-up. . . or liquidation (other than pursuant to a consolidation, amalgamation 
or merger)[.]”  Id. § (5).   
46
  See id. § 6(a) (indicating that upon a continuing event of default, the non-defaulting party then has 
a right to terminate the Agreement).  This right or option to terminate may be subjected to limitation by the 
parties to the contract.  See id.; Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, Schedule to the 1992 Master Agreement, 
pt. I(e) [hereinafter 1992 Schedule] (allowing for parties to elect for an automatic termination upon selected 
“events of bankruptcy,” as defined in Section 5(a)(vii) of the 1992 Agreement). 
47
  Id. § 6(a) (indicating that an “early termination date” includes termination following an event of 
default).  
48
  Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 19. 
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the specifically enumerated events of default due to bankruptcy,49 the non-
defaulting party does not have a right to elect termination of the transactions, 
as this option ends the transactions automatically.50  
The non-defaulting party considers a number of factors when 
determining when and whether to elect an early termination date.51  If the 
non-defaulting party is risk-averse, or changes in the market affect their 
position adversely, the non-defaulting party would declare the termination 
date as soon as possible to avoid any loss in position.52  Alternatively, the 
non-defaulting party may choose not to declare an early termination date if 
they are willing to risk that the market may move favorably in their 
direction.53  In the event that the defaulting party is owed money by the non-
defaulting party, it may be in the best interests of the non-defaulting party 
not to declare an early termination date at all.54  Thus, more important than 
the right to set an early termination date is the right not to.55   
Parties to the Master Agreement have two main options for 
designating an early termination date in the event of default56 as provided in 
the Model Agreement: First Method and Second Method. 57   The First 
Method allows a non-defaulting party to collect payment in the event they 
                                           
49
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a) (setting forth the default events that may give rise to an 
automatic termination).  
50
  See id., as elected by the parties in the Schedule.  1992 Schedule, supra note 46, pt. I(e).  For a 
further discussion of the automatic termination date, see infra Part VI.B. 
51
  See Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 3. 
52
  See FRANZEN, supra note 19, at 23.  The declaration of the termination event solidifies the party’s 
economic gain or loss.  If it is a gain for the non-defaulting party it is submitted as a claim to the liquidation 
of the defaulting party.  In the event that the solidified amount is a loss to the non-defaulting party, then 
payment is subject to the method elected.  See Bergman, supra note 14, at 16-17 (regarding the insolvency 
of financial institutions); see also infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.  
53
  MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 4-5.  If successful, a party could increase the amount of their 
claim or decrease their liability to the defaulting party.  Id. 
54
  This was the decision made by TXU in the case of Enron Australia’s event of default.  See 
discussion infra Part IV; Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 19. 
55
  See infra Part IV.  Cf. Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266 (concluding that the non-defaulting 
party indeed does not have to declare an early termination date, and cannot be compelled to do so by the 
Australian courts).  
56
   1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a), (e)(i).  
57
  Id. § 6(e).  There are also two options for the method of determining the amounts owed: “market 
quotation” and “loss.”  See id. § 14 (defining “loss” and “market quotation”).  As these distinctions have 
little relevance to the present discussion, it is sufficient to note that “loss” is essentially the value of the 
total loss and costs associated with the termination of the transactions as determined by the good faith 
efforts of the parties to the agreement, while “market quotation” is the present value of the future 
transactions that would have been paid based on prices set by principal market participants and market-
makers.  See id.   
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are in-the-money,58 and pay nothing in the event they owe money to the 
defaulting party. 59   The First Method is used less frequently, 60  but its 
consequences to creditors of the insolvent defaulting party remain 
important.61  The Second Method is the purported bilateral netting option, 
which requires either party to pay the net close-out amount, regardless of 
which party defaulted.62  This method is particularly important with regard 
to the netting requirement, as it allows a party and its creditors the assurance 
that payments will be available in the event of liquidation.63  
Parties contracting under the Master Agreement have another option 
regarding the termination of the transactions.64  The parties may elect for an 
early termination date to be set automatically in the event that a party 
defaults via a particular event of bankruptcy.65  This option may avoid any 
question of whether a non-defaulting party should assume the risk and wait 
before setting an early termination date.  It also provides greater certainty to 
                                           
58
  A party to a swap instrument is in-the-money if, in the event of termination of the Agreement, that 
party would be owed a net payment from the counterparty.  This terminology comes from the valuation of 
options.  ROBERT A. STRONG, DERIVATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION 29 (2002) (stating that an in-the-money 
option is defined as an option that has intrinsic value in that upon exercise the value will be higher than the 
exercise price). 
59
  See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(e)(i)(1), (3).  
60
  See, e.g., Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 415 (noting that the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement 
leaves out the First Method as an option).  The First Method is not used for regulated financial institutions 
as the capital adequacy requirements of most jurisdictions, per the Basle Capital Accord, do not allow for a 
clause that allows a non-defaulting party to walk away from their obligations under the netting agreement.  
See, e.g., FDIC Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 12 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. A (II)(E)(5)(b) (1999) 
(adopting the exact language in the 1994 amendment to the Basle Capital Accord); Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority Guidance Note 112.3 (8)(f) (Sept. 2000) (netting agreements for Authorized Deposit 
taking institutions may only be given effect in the absence of a walkaway clause).  This disallowance is in 
an effort to maintain systemic stability and encourage the efficient use of capital by financial institutions.  
By not electing the First Method, institutions can theoretically count the amount expected under a netting 
agreement as an asset in the event of insolvency, thus decreasing requisite capital reserve amounts, and 
freeing up capital that may used more productively.  Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 156; Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision, The Treatment of the Credit Risk Associated With Certain Off-
Balance Sheet Items, pt. 2, para. 5 (July 1994). 
61
  See discussion infra Part V.  
62
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(e)(i)(3) &(4).  
63
  See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 415.  The Second Method was actually deemed to be 
required for this very purpose of assurance via the 1994 amendment to the Basel Capital Accord.  See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 60, pt. II.  
64
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a). 
65
  1992 Schedule, supra note 46, pt. (I)(e).  Parties may elect to have the automatic early termination 
provision apply to either or both parties.  Id.  Particular events of bankruptcy include dissolution of a 
company, assignment to creditors, winding-up of the company, and the appointment of an administrator or 
receiver, respectively.  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, §§ 5(a)(vii) (1), (3), (5), and (6). 
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the defaulting party in the event of liquidation and allows for more expedient 
and efficient winding up66 of the liquidating company.67 
C. Flawed Asset Provision 
Parties under the Master Agreement are required to make payments 
periodically as set forth in the confirmations of the individual transactions.68  
The party’s payment obligations are subject to two conditions precedent.69  
First, there must not be a continuing event of default by the counterparty.70 
Second, there must be no declaration of an early termination date.71  Thus, if 
one party is in default via insolvency or liquidation, then the counterparty’s 
payment obligation is stayed as long as the defaulting condition persists.72  A 
corollary logically follows—a party may cure a position of default, and 
cause the suspended payment obligation to be revived, so long as an early 
termination date has not already been set.73 
While the mechanics of the flawed asset provision are very 
straightforward in theory, in practice it is a controversial term.74   Some 
jurisdictions allow parties to avoid such provisions by statute, even voiding 
the effectiveness entirely.75  Traditional freedom of contract arguments assert 
that it would be unfair to allow an insolvent party to expect performance 
under a contract when that party is unable to meet its contractual 
obligations.76  When such provisions are upheld as enforceable in the courts, 
freedom of contract proponents are pleased that parties may rely on the 
                                           
66
  “Winding up” is the process by which the assets are sold and creditors are paid in preparation for 
the dissolution of a business organization. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
67
  See infra Part VI.B. 
68
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2 (a)(i).  
69
  Id. at § 2 (a)(iii).  
70
  Id. at § 2(a)(iii)(1).  
71
  Id. at § 2(a)(iii)(2).  
72
  See id. at §§ 2(a)(iii), 5(a)(vii); infra Part IV.  See, e.g., Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU 
Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 12 (Enron Australia’s continued insolvency continued to suspend 
the payment obligation of TXU). 
73
  See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § (2)(a)(iii)(1); Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 12.   
74
  See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 414-15; MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 1.   
75
  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000) (allowing for the cure of defaults conditioned on bankruptcy, and 
disallowing the alteration of terms, such as suspending performance, of a contract based on bankruptcy 
proceedings).  
76
  See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 416.  The operation of the flawed asset provision, if given 
effect by the local jurisdiction, makes sure that the defaulting party derives no benefit from the contract, if 
it is in fact in default.  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(a)(iii).  See generally Alan Schwartz, Contracting 
for Bankruptcy Systems, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 281, 286-87 (proposing that 
parties should not be restricted from contracting about bankruptcy issues).  The United States Bankruptcy 
Code limits parties’ ability to contract about bankruptcy by allowing the debtor to cure default in 
unexecuted executory contracts if default is based on insolvency or bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2000).  
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terms contracted for.77   An opposing viewpoint sees these provisions as 
potentially unfair and in conflict with the bankruptcy system.78  
D. Additional Termination Events 
Parties to the Master Agreement may elect to designate an additional 
termination event in the schedule to the agreement.79  This allows parties to 
set forth additional events in the Master Agreement’s schedule that result in 
early termination.80   Under the additional termination event provision, a 
party may negotiate a clause that will give it greater control of ending or 
liquidating transactions upon the occurrence of a specified event.81  This 
clause demonstrates that the Master Agreement is truly a set of default rules 
that parties can contract around and adapt to their individual preferences 
subject to the governing jurisdiction’s laws.82  
III. AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW IS MARKED BY A 
BACKGROUND OF LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
A. Background and Jurisdiction 
The Corporations Act of 2001 currently governs corporate insolvency 
in Australia.83  General Australian corporations law represents a forty-year 
movement toward a uniform federal body of law. 84   The Australian 
Constitution provides no direct provision for giving federal jurisdiction over 
corporations law.85  In reaction to the uncertainty of a uniform body of law 
                                           
77
  See Weinstein et al., supra note 17, at 4 n. 13 
78
  See generally Waldman, supra note 14 (noting generally that the ISDA Master Agreement has 
largely been incompatible and in conflict with the United States Bankruptcy Code)   
79
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(b)(v); 1992 Schedule, supra note 46, pt. 1(h).  
80
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § §6(b).  Termination events listed in the Agreement itself include 
an illegality or the imposition of a new tax affecting the parties’ transactions.  Id.   
81
   See, e.g., CLAYTON UTZ, ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT: EFFECTIVENESS OF “FLAWED ASSET” 
CLAUSE – ENRON V. TXU, (March 29, 2005), http://www.claytonutz.com/areas_of_law/ 
controller.asp?aolstring=3&na=797 (discussing the additional termination event listed in the Enron 
Australia Master Agreement that was originally designed to prevent unfair operation of the flawed asset 
provision on the buyer of an option); see discussion infra Part V.A.  
82
  This raises the question as to whether Enron Australia, as a sophisticated party, should have relied 
on the terms of the Master Agreement, or whether Enron Australia’s counsel failed to sufficiently consider 
every possible outcome under the terms of the contract.  See discussion infra Part VI. 
83
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5 (Austl.).  
84
  See generally DUNS, supra note 32, at 4-6 (discussing the move of jurisdiction over corporate law 
from the states and territories to that of the commonwealth).  
85
  2-14 COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INSOLVENCY GUIDE, pt. 14.01 (1) (MB) [hereinafter 
COLLIER INTERNATIONAL].  But see Constitution § 51(xvii) (Austl.) (granting Commonwealth jurisdiction 
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governing corporations, and in an effort to ground Commonwealth 
jurisdiction over corporate law in the Australian Constitution, the States and 
Territories agreed to refer their jurisdiction to the Commonwealth.86  The 
States and Territories referred legislative jurisdiction to the Commonwealth 
and accepted the Commonwealth Parliament’s legislation of the 
Corporations Act 200187 as the current governing body of law for corporate 
insolvency in Australia.88  
Both the federal courts and the state or territory courts preside over 
corporate insolvency matters,89 although state and territory supreme courts 
resolve most corporate insolvency issues.90   Decisions of the Supreme Court 
Judge sitting alone are appealed to the Supreme Court – Court of Appeal,91 
before being appealed to the High Court of Australia.92  
                                                                                                                              
over individual bankruptcy law and proceedings); Constitution § 51(xx) (Austl.) (granting Commonwealth 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations).  
86
  See Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001, § 1(2) (N.S.W.); Explanatory Notes to 
Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Bill 2001, 1 (Queensl.).  This allowed jurisdiction to be grounded in 
the Australian Constitution, which allows the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate over areas of law that 
the States and Territories have referred to the Commonwealth.  See Constitution § 51(xxxvii) (Austl.). 
87
  Corporations Act, 2001 (Austl.).  Each State and the Northern Territory passed identical 
legislation referring legislative jurisdiction to the Commonwealth Parliament.  See, e.g., Corporations 
(Commonwealth Powers) Act, 2001 (N.S.W.) (relinquishing jurisdiction of corporate law to the 
Commonwealth).  
88
  See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5 (Austl.).  See generally DUNS, supra note 32.  The Corporations 
Act of 2001 was essentially substantively identical to the Corporations Act of 1989, except the former had 
constitutional grounds for jurisdictional authority.  Id.; see Corporations Act of 2001, ch. 1, pt.1.1, § 3 
(Austl.) (basing jurisdiction on the referral of jurisdiction by the States and Territories, pursuant to 
paragraph 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution).  
89
  See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 9, pt. 9.6A, div. 1, § 1337B. 
90
  See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.03(1).  The State and Territory Supreme 
Courts are the highest courts in the States and Northern Territory.  However, this system is not as linear of 
a judicial hierarchy as in the United States.  See generally Mary Crock & Ronald McCallum, Australia’s 
Courts: Their Origins, Structure and Jurisdiction, 46 S.C. L. REV. 719 (1995) (noting that unlike in the 
United States, the Australian Commonwealth originally vested federal jurisdiction upon the lower state 
courts until the 1960s).  Civil cases in New South Wales involving amounts greater than $750,000 have 
original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.  See N.S.W. DEP’T EDUC. & TRAINING, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
NEW SOUTH WALES COURT SYSTEM, at http://www.schools.nsw.edu.au/sites/nswconstitution/ 
html/5th/bgr/overview.html [hereinafter COURT STRUCTURE].  
91
  Appeals from a decision by the Supreme Court are seen by a panel of three Supreme Court Judges. 
COURT STRUCTURE, supra note 90. 
92
  Id.  The High Court of Australia only hears cases by granting of petition to the Court.  Crock & 
McCallum, supra note 90, at 733. 
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B. Voluntary Administration and Winding Up 
Australian law provides alternatives to immediate liquidation for a 
corporation in financial trouble.93  Corporations typically favor voluntary 
administration proceedings, 94  because the courts are not involved in the 
initial stages of administration. 95   Appointing an administrator allows a 
struggling company the best chance to continue its existence by emerging 
from or avoiding insolvency. 96   In order to enter into voluntary 
administration, a company must officially determine that it is either 
insolvent or is likely to become insolvent,97 and that it needs the aid of an 
administrator.98  
Once a company is in voluntary administration, there are two 
phases. 99   First, the administrator takes control of the company and its 
affairs,100 acts as the company’s agent,101 and investigates what future plan 
for the company will be in the creditors’ best interests.102  Second, within 
twenty-one days of the beginning of the administration,103 the administrator 
convenes a meeting of the creditors to determine whether the company 
                                           
93
  See, e.g., Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A (voluntary administration).  Other jurisdictions 
have similar alternatives to liquidation in an attempt to financially revive a corporation.  See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. ch. 11 (business reorganizations); see also AUSTL. L. REFORM COMM’N, REP. NO. 45: GENERAL 
INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, CH. 3 (Dec. 1988) (considering the merits of other jurisdictions’ alternatives to 
liquidation) [hereinafter Harmer Report].  The liquidation of a company under the Australian corporation 
law is referred to as winding up.  See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6 (Austl.).  
94
  See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.06(1).  
95
  See id.; DUNS, supra note 32, at 449-50.  The other alternative to liquidation for corporations 
under Australian insolvency law is a Scheme of Arrangement, where the debtor company enters into a 
court-approved restructured set of agreements with its creditors in order to remain solvent. Corporations 
Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.1 (Austl.).  
96
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, § 435A (Austl.). 
97
  Insolvency under the Corporations Act of 2001 is defined as the inability to pay debts as they 
become due.  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 1, pt. 1.2, div. 7, § 95A (Austl.); see also Paul B. Lewis, Trouble 
Down Under: Some Thoughts on the Australian-American Corporate Bankruptcy Divide, 2001 UTAH L. 
REV. 189, 191-92 (discussing the process of Voluntary Administration in more detail). 
98
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, § 436A (Austl.); see also DUNS, supra note 32, at 449-50 
(noting the fairly simple process by which an administrator is selected and Voluntary Administration 
begins).  
99
  Lewis, supra note 97, at 192-93. 
100
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, div. 3, § 437A (Austl.).   
101
  Id. § 437B.  
102
  Id. div. 4, § 438A.  The administrator is charged with determining whether it would be in the 
creditor’s interests for the company to form a plan of arrangement, for the administration to end, or for the 
company to be wound up.  Id. at (b).  
103
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, div. 5, § 439A (Austl.).  The 21-day period is extendable 
by court order. Id. at (6).  
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should: 1) enter into an arrangement with the creditors, 2) exit 
administration, or 3) be wound up.104  
If the creditors vote that the corporation should be wound up, the 
company begins the liquidation process by appointing a liquidator who then 
collects as much money as possible to maximize the return to the company’s 
creditors.105  The liquidator has extensive control over the company and 
exercises that control for the principal benefit of the company’s creditors, 
subject only to the control of the court.106  The liquidator additionally may 
bring legal proceedings in the company’s name.107  
C. Contractual Rights in Liquidation and Judicial Discretion 
The liquidator’s control includes the right to collect any amount owed 
to the company from counterparties under contract.108  The liquidator also 
has the power to disclaim a contract.109  If the contract is for a lease or is 
unprofitable, no court approval is required for the liquidator to disclaim the 
contract.110  Other types of contracts can be disclaimed by obtaining court 
approval.111  When a court allows a contract’s disclaimer, the disclaimer 
affects the other party’s rights only to the extent necessary to relieve the 
disclaiming company from liability.112  The counterparty may then submit a 
creditor claim against the company in liquidation for damages suffered as a 
result of the effective disclaimer.113  
                                           
104
  Id. at § 439C.  
105
  See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.4B, div. 2, § 477 (Austl).  The liquidator is to carry on the 
business of the company as long as necessary in order to favorably collect and disburse the value from the 
assets of the business.  Id.  
106
  See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.04 (4)(b)(v)(B).  
107
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.4B, div. 2, § 477 (2)(a) (Austl.).  
108
  See id. at (1)(a), (2)(ca); id. div. 3, § 483 (3)(a). 
109
  There are two key consequences of a disclaimed contract under the Corporations Act of 2001.  
Enron v. TXU, (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 57.  First, the company in liquidation is deprived of any right 
to future performance upon the contract’s disclaimer.  Second, the counterparty’s contractual rights are 
unaffected by the contract’s disclaimer.  See also Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd, 
(2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12, pp. 23-24 (citing the case below and generally agreeing with the reasoning of J. 
Austin).  
110
  See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(1A) (Austl.).  The liquidator need only 
sign a written disclaimer of the contract in question. Id. at  (1).  
111
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(h).  The court may grant leave and “make 
such orders in connection with matters arising under, or relating to the contract; as the Court deems just and 
equitable.”  Id. (1B).  
112
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (Austl.).  This acts to limit the scope of 
the discretion of the courts in granting disclaimer of a contract that is not considered unprofitable.  See 
Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 57; discussion infra Part 
IV.  
113
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(2) (Austl.).  
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Unprofitable contracts are defined with substantial breadth.114  The 
Australian courts have recognized this breadth, in keeping with the 
underlying policy goals of maximizing the return to a liquidating company’s 
creditors in an expedient fashion.115  This policy conflicts with a liquidator’s 
obligation to maximize returns for the creditors when a company in 
liquidation is a party to a favorable, yet long-term contract that might require 
performance over an extended period of time.116  The liquidator also carries 
on the business of the company to the extent necessary to provide maximum 
benefit the creditors. 117   Whether the temporal or financial goals take 
precedence depends on the circumstances of the liquidation.118 
The court has ultimate discretion to allow a disclaimer when a 
liquidator seeks court approval to disclaim a contract.119  It may impose 
additional conditions upon the parties, or make orders regarding matters 
“arising under, or relating to, the contract; as the Court considers just and 
equitable.”120  While the language appears to grant substantial discretion to 
the judiciary,121 the exercisable discretion remains limited by Section 568D, 
and Division 7A of Part 5.6, in Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act of 2001, 
which states that disclaimer does not affect any other party’s rights, “except 
as far as necessary to release the company [in liquidation] and its property 
from liability.”122  
Liquidators have a duty to seek the maximum benefit for creditors 
when winding up a company. 123  Courts have broad power in order to affect 
this goal. 124   Judicial discretion is narrowed by the opposing goal of 
completing the winding up process in a timely manner, and by a statutory 
limitation that seeks to avoid judicially rewriting contracts.125 
                                           
114
  DUNS, supra note 32, at 239 (citing Dekala Pty. Ltd. (in liq.) v. Perth Land and Leisure Ltd. 
(1989) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 664 (suggesting that a showing of monetary loss is not absolutely necessary to show 
that a contract is unprofitable)).  
115
  See, e.g., Global Television Pty. Ltd. v. Sportsvision Australia Pty. Ltd. (in liq.) (2000) 35 
A.C.S.R. 484, 496 (stating that a liquidator’s obligation is to realize income from assets and disburse them 
to the creditors “at the earliest possible time”). 
116
  See id.  
117
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.4B, div. 2, § 477(1)(a) (Austl.). 
118
  Whether a timely winding up is controlling over the liquidator’s duty to maximize the profits, or 
vice versa, is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For present purposes, it is enough to note these tensions 
within Australian insolvency law.  
119
  See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(1B) (Austl.). 
120
  Id. 
121
  Enron Austl. (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12, para. 25.  
122
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (Austl.); see discussion infra Part. IV.  
123
  See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.04 (4)(b)(v)(B). 
124
  See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(1B) (Austl.). 
125
  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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IV. LIMITS ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION PREVENTED ENRON AUSTRALIA FROM 
REALIZING THE BENEFIT OF THE SWAP CONTRACT 
Enron Australia’s liquidators failed to realize money allegedly owed 
under the Master Agreement.126  The liquidators sought court approval to 
disclaim the swap contract with TXU, conditioned on the declaration of an 
early termination date.127  Although the court’s decision resulted in a 
windfall to TXU, the court properly recognized that it was without discretion 
to grant the qualified disclaimer.128 
A. Enron Australia’s Liquidators Were Unable to Realize the Financial 
Benefit of the Swap Agreement   
On December 2, 2001, Enron Australia, a foreign subsidiary of Enron 
in the United States, entered into voluntary administration as a result of 
Enron’s now infamous financial collapse.129  On January 29, 2002, Enron 
Australia’s creditors voted to place the company into liquidation.130  Enron 
Australia had entered into an electricity swap agreement with TXU.131 The 
parties memorialized their swap contract using the Master Agreement.132 
Under the agreement’s terms, 133  Enron Australia committed an event of 
default when it entered into voluntary administration, and continued in 
default when its creditors voted it into liquidation.134  Under the Master 
Agreement’s flawed asset provision,135  TXU’s payment obligations were 
suspended. 136   TXU also had the contractual right to declare an early 
                                           
126
  See infra Part IV.A. 
127
  See infra Part IV.B. 
128
  See infra Part IV.C. 
129
  Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 2; see also 
Interview by ceoforum.com.au with Paul Quilkey, former Managing Director, Enron Australia (Nov. 
2002), at http://www.ceoforum.com.au/200211_ceoinsight.cfm [hereinafter Quilkey Interview] (discussing 
the effects of Enron’s bankruptcy in the United States on the Australian subsidiary). 
130
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 2; see supra Part III.B for the discussion of the 
procedure from voluntary administration to liquidation. 
131
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 5-7.  There was also an agreement entered into by 
Enron Australia with Yallourn Energy Pty. Ltd.; however, to the extent that these two agreements are 
afforded similar treatment by the New South Wales Supreme Court, only the situation involving TXU will 
be addressed in this Comment.  
132
  Id., para. 6; see supra Part II.  
133
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(vii) (regarding an event of “bankruptcy” as an event of 
default); see also supra Part II.B. (discussing the relevant events of default). 
134
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 14.  The appointment of an administrator constitutes 
an event of default under Section 5(vii)(6), while Section 5(vii)(5) includes the winding-up or liquidation of 
a company to be an event of default.  1992 Master Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(vii). 
135
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(a)(iii)(1).  
136
  See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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termination date as a result of Enron Australia’s default. 137   However, 
terminating all outstanding transactions would result in TXU owing an 
estimated net amount of $3.3 million (Austl.) to Enron Australia.138  TXU 
had the option, but not the obligation, to declare an early termination date, 
and subsequently chose not to exercise that option. 139   This left Enron 
Australia’s liquidators with an unrealizable but active contract that 
effectively held them in limbo.140 
B. Enron Australia’s Liquidators Sought a Partial Disclaimer of the 
Swap Agreement 
Enron Australia’s liquidators attempted to collect under the Master 
Agreement by seeking leave of the court to disclaim the contract.141  The 
liquidator’s argument relied on the Additional Termination Event provision 
contracted by the parties142  that entitled Enron Australia to set an early 
termination date upon Enron’s satisfaction of all payment obligations, when 
no future payment obligations to TXU remained.143  This situation would be 
satisfied when all transactions entered into under the Master Agreement 
expired. 144   Furthermore, the liquidators claimed that setting an early 
termination date at that time would entitle them to payment of the accrued 
net amount owed under TXU’s suspended payment obligation.145  Enron 
Australia’s liquidators advanced a unique argument in an effort to currently 
realize the potential amount claimed to be owed by TXU.146  The liquidators 
suggested that the provisions of the Corporations Act of 2001, which address 
the disclaimer of contracts in liquidation, 147  allowed the judiciary 
sufficiently broad discretion to give the court the power to approve the 
disclaimer of the Master Agreement, while simultaneously issuing an order 
                                           
137
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a).  
138
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 8.  This is the amount calculated by Enron Australia at 
the commencement of the litigation discussed herein; see infra Part IV.B.  
139
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 18-19.  
140
  See discussion infra Part V. 
141
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 25.  
142
  See discussion of Additional Termination Events supra Part II.D. 
143
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 21-22.  These are the terms of the Additional 
Termination Event that Enron Australia and TXU contracted for in Part 1(h) of the Schedule to the 1992 
Master Agreement.  Id.; see 1992 Schedule, supra note 6, pt. 1(h).   
144
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 21.  
145
  Id., para. 23.  But see discussion infra Part V.A. 
146
  Id.  
147
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568  (Austl.). 
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that had the identical effect of designating an Early Termination Date.148  
This would allow Enron Australia to collect the net amount owed, as 
calculated under the terms of the Master Agreement.149  
The liquidators argued that: 1) under Section 568 of the Corporations 
Act of 2001, the judiciary may grant the disclaimer of the Master 
Agreement, thus relieving Enron Australia’s obligations under the 
contract, 150  and 2) the judge additionally has the power to make the 
supplemental order to effect an Early Termination Date under Section 568 
(1B)(b) of the Corporations Act, as an order “in connection with matters 
arising under, or relating to, the contract.”151  
C. The Supreme Court of New South Wales Correctly Decided the 
Limitations on Judicial Discretion to Allow Contract Disclaimer 
On December 24, 2003, Judge Austin, sitting in the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, heard Enron Australia’s liquidators’ arguments152  and 
determined that although the statutory language initially appeared to broadly 
grant significant power to the judiciary, the words themselves were limited 
by the context of the surrounding provisions.153  Judge Austin noted that if 
the liquidators’ request were to be granted, it would effectively impose an 
affirmative obligation on TXU that did not arise from the contractual terms, 
thus altering the original terms contracted for by the parties.154  Furthermore, 
the effect of the Section 568D(1) was held to clearly limit the extent to 
which disclaimer may apply.155    
The effect of Section 568D(1) limiting the application of disclaimer is 
supported by a substantial body of case law156 which recognizes two key 
                                           
148
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 27-28. 
149
  See discussion of close-out netting supra Part II.B. 
150
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 27.  
151
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568 (1B)(b) (Austl.). 
152
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 45-76.  Enron’s liquidators’ support for their position 
relied on the breadth given to the interpretation of the statutory language “in connection with” and “relating 
to” in Section 568(1B)(b) of the Corporations Act of 2001, the increasing permissiveness of the allowance 
of disclaimer through the legislative history, and the general legislative intent behind the allowance of 
disclaimer for the purposes of winding up the company in an efficient and timely manner.  Id.  
153
  Id., para. 40.  
154
  Id., para 41.  The original terms would be altered by allowing Enron Australia to effectively 
declare an early termination date when they are actively in default.  Enron is thus not entitled to so declare 
under the terms of the agreement.  See supra Part II.C–D. 
155
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (limiting the extent to which disclaimer 
may affect the rights of other parties only to the extent necessary to relieve the disclaiming party from 
liability); see supra Part III.C. 
156
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 57.  
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aspects of disclaimer. 157   First, it is generally accepted that disclaimer 
deprives the disclaiming company of the right to future performance by the 
counterparty.158  Second, the counterparty’s vested rights arising under the 
contract are generally not to be affected by the disclaimer.159  In order to be 
consistent with this precedent and give effect to Section 568D(1), Section 
568(1B) cannot bestow so much power upon the court as to allow for the 
imposition of an order not arising from the original contract the liquidators 
seek to disclaim.160  
Judge Austin further supported his decision by noting that limiting the 
breadth of the statutory language is consistent with the general legislative 
intent behind the disclaimer provisions in the Corporations Act of 2001.161  
He indicated that the disclaimer’s purpose was to rid the company of 
burdensome property in order to facilitate the company’s timely and efficient 
liquidation.162  The disclaimer provisions operate in detailed and specific 
manners in order to facilitate this goal.163  Thus, the power to disclaim is 
limited and not all-inclusive.164  
On December 7, 2004, the New South Wales Court of Appeal heard 
Enron Australia’s liquidators’ appeal.165  The court unanimously affirmed 
Judge Austin’s opinion, and directly adopted the lower court’s reasoning in 
multiple passages.166  The liquidators’ argument was against the weight of 
legal authority.  Although the outcome is well-supported and appears to 
follow the letter of the law, its effects create some inequities, at least to 
                                           
157
 Id.; see supra n. 109 and accompanying text.  
158
 Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (disclaimer terminates the rights and 
interests of the disclaiming party to the disclaimed property); see Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, 
para. 57 (citing authority). 
159
  Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1). 
160
  See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 58 (agreeing with TXU’s argument that the 
liquidator’s proposed orders would alter TXU’s existing right not to declare an early termination date under 
the Agreement, and is thus in conflict with Section 568D(1) of the Corporations Act of 2001).  
161
  See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 72-76 (citing Re Middle Harbour Inv. Ltd (in liq) 
(No. 2) (1977) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 652, 657 (Austl.) (stating that the purpose of disclaimer is to rid the estate of 
burdensome contracts in an effort to facilitate the timely administration of the bankruptcy estate)).  
162
  See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 76; see also Global Television (2000) 35 A.C.S.R. 
484, 489 (noting the same).  
163
  Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 76. 
164
  Id.  
165
  See Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd, (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12.  The three-judge 
panel reviewed the decision of the Supreme Court to determine whether Judge Austin erred in construing 
the scope of the statutory power of disclaimer conferred upon the court.  Id. para. 5.  
166
  See, e.g., Enron Austl. (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12, paras. 23, 38 (citing opinion of Judge Austin, 
below).  Because the reasoning of the New South Wales Supreme Court was so heavily relied upon, present 
discussion focuses on that court’s reasoning.  The most relevant and significant reactions were to the 
decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court’s decision.  See infra Part V.  
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Enron Australia’s creditors. 167   Although Enron Australia’s creditors in 
liquidation were not parties to the electricity swap here at issue, the question 
presents itself as to how much they knew about the Master Agreement’s 
existence and terms contained therein, and how much Enron Australia’s in-
the-money position affected the extension of credit and accompanying 
terms.168  
V. WIDESPREAD REACTION BY MARKET PRACTITIONERS EXPOSED 
LEGITIMATE CONCERNS 
The decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court and the 
subsequent affirmation by the Court of Appeal were well reasoned and 
properly decided.  The seeming windfall received by TXU as a result of 
Enron Australia’s inability to collect the sums allegedly owed caught the 
attention of many practitioners involved in corporate insolvency and 
derivative instruments.169  While the consensus remains that the decision 
was legally sound,170  the seeming inequity caused speculation as to the 
effects and implications of the decision.171  A significant concern is whether 
the basis of Enron Australia’s claim—that the Additional Termination event 
would operate to allow Enron Australia to actually collect the amounts owed 
by setting an Early Termination Date at the expiration of all the outstanding 
transactions—was correct, thus eliminating the need for these 
proceedings.172  Such a determination would only serve to underscore the 
joint operation of the flawed assets provision and the non-defaulting party’s 
                                           
167
  The creditors were not parties to the Swap Agreement.  It thus appears that the court was 
balancing the equities of enforcing the model provisions of a valid contract, and allowing a windfall to 
TXU, against the harm to the creditors of Enron Australia with regard to what is perhaps the poorly 
understood operation of the terms of the 1992 Master Agreement.  See infra Part V.B. 
168
  See infra Part V.C. 
169
  See, e.g., Walker & Usher, supra note 7 (citing the potential impacts of this decision, generally); 
MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13 (discussing the lack of an impact of the decision under Canadian law). 
170
  See, e.g., Enron Austl. (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12 (affirming the decision of the lower court); 
Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating that the outcome is of minimal surprise). 
171
  Carter, supra note 13 (reporting that the Financial Services Authority of England asked the Bank 
of England to review the Enron Australia ruling as to the potential impacts on financial institutions); see 
Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating that the Financial Markets Lawyers Group of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York is reviewing the potential outcome under U.S. law, and the financial regulatory 
issues that may have been brought to light).  
172
  See MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 5; infra Part V.A.  The New South Wales Supreme Court 
followed this reasoning again when it determined Enron could designate an Early Termination Date under 
the 1992 Agreement.  Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd  (in liq.) v. Yallourn Energy Pty Ltd (2005) N.S.W.S.C. 56, 
para. 26.  The main issues before the court involved the amount of interest payable by each party. Id., para. 
11.   
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power to indefinitely suspend the election of a termination date, which 
would subversively cause the Master Agreement to operate contrary to the 
language on its face. 173  In allowing the non-defaulting party to walk away 
from its obligation, the outcome of this case is inconsistent with the Master 
Agreement’s purpose and operation.  While parties are generally indifferent 
to how creditors are treated in the event of liquidation, this shifting of risk 
will affect the relationship with both creditors and investors in the normal 
course of business. 174 
A. Enron Australia’s Claim Was Based on a Faulty Assumption.  
Enron Australia’s liquidators proposed that, under the terms of the 
Additional Termination Event, Enron Australia would have the right to 
declare an Early Termination Date upon the expiration of all of the 
underlying transactions. 175   Enron Australia’s liquidators attempted (and 
failed) to persuade the court that such funds, due as a result of this alleged 
future right to realize the benefit of their position, should be currently 
collected.176  While their argument was soundly defeated, the underlying 
presumption that they were entitled to the amount owed in the future is 
flawed.177  The Additional Termination Event set forth by Enron Australia 
and TXU was not originally contemplated to operate in the event that a non-
defaulting party refused to make payments or set an Early Termination 
Date. 178   The original purpose of the clause was to allow defaulting 
purchasers of an option, who have fully performed payment obligations, to 
obtain delivery despite the operation of the flawed asset provision.179  
A closer look at Enron Australia’s liquidators’ attempted application of 
the Additional Termination Event shows that this Additional Termination 
Event clause was not contemplated to apply under these circumstances, and 
would likely be ineffective in helping Enron Australia’s liquidators to realize 
the benefit of any money owed.  Upon the last outstanding agreement’s 
expiration, the Additional Termination Event would allow Enron Australia to 
                                           
173
  See infra Part V.B.  
174
  See infra Part V.C. 
175
 Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 21. 
176
  See supra Part IV.B.  
177
  MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 4-5.  But see Yallourn (2005) N.S.W.S.C. 56, para. 12 – 26 
(where the court again accepted, after cursory discussion, that the 1992 Agreement provided Enron 
Australia with the contractual right to declare an Early Termination Date under the Additional Termination 
Event in the Schedule to the 1992 Agreement). 
178
  CLAYTON UTZ, supra note 81. 
179
  Id. 
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declare an Early Termination Date. 180   The amounts owed include the 
“Unpaid Amounts” under the Master Agreement,181 which are defined with 
respect to the “Terminated Transactions.”182  It is presumed that the election 
of an Early Termination Date would, in fact, arise from Enron Australia’s 
ongoing Event of Default. 183   Thus, only the transactions in effect 
immediately before the declaration of an Early Termination Date would be 
collectible.184  The ability to make that declaration, however, is conditioned 
upon the expiration of each individual transaction (as the expiration of Enron 
Australia’s payment obligations).  There would be no transactions in effect 
just before Enron Australia attempted to set an Early Termination Date.  
Thus, under this reasoning, such an event would not give rise to any 
payment obligation on the part of TXU.  This result further demonstrates 
that it was not likely contemplated by the parties to the Agreement, or their 
creditors, that this Additional Termination Event was meant to apply on 
these facts. 
B. The Master Agreement Contradicts the Purpose of the ISDA and the 
Terms of the Master AgreementI. 
Those pleased with the decision in the Enron Australia case were 
happy that the terms of the Master Agreement could be enforced “as 
written.”185  While this is true, the decision allowed the Master Agreement’s 
                                           
180
  See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 22; see discussion supra Part II.C-D for the 
definition of these terms.  
181
  1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 14.  Unpaid Amounts include the amount that becomes payable 
before or as a result of the Early Termination Date, and is still unpaid.  Id.  
182
  The 1992 Master Agreement defines “Terminated Transactions” as:  
[W]ith respect to any Early Termination Date (a) if resulting from a termination event, all 
Affected Transactions and (b) if resulting from an Event of default, all Transactions (in either 
case) in effect immediately before the effectiveness of the notice designating that Early 
Termination Date (or, if ‘Automatic Early Termination’ applies, immediately before that Early 
Termination Date). 
Id. 
183
  However, this is arguable.  If it is treated as arising from the Additional Termination Event, 
without reference to the Event of Default, then unpaid amounts would include all transactions, via the 
definition of Affected Transactions.  Affected Transactions are said to include all transactions, except in 
limited circumstances that do not apply here.  Id.  Even if Enron might be entitled to payment eventually, 
the delay in the liquidation process is significant and against one of the key underlying policies behind 
Australian insolvency law, of providing an orderly process with the minimal delay and expense.  Harmer 
Report, supra note 93, pt. 1, § 2, para. 33.  Furthermore, it is illogical for parties to intentionally allow the 
terms of a contract to drag out the liquidation process, and would certainly be significant to the creditors of 
a party under such an agreement.  
184
  MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 5. 
185
  See, e.g. Weinstein, et al., supra note 13, at 4 (noting the widespread positive reaction triggered by 
this decision, that essentially enforced the contract as it was written).  
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terms to act in tandem to undermine the contract as it was written.  Although 
a victory for freedom of contract ideologues, the outcome of this decision 
exposed circumstances in which the actual effect of the Master Agreement 
operates contrary to its underlying purpose.  
The flawed asset provision in Section 2(a)(iii) of the Master 
Agreement, operating in conjunction with the right of the non-defaulting 
party to refrain from electing an Early Termination Date, effectively turns 
the Second Method into the First Method by indefinitely relieving the non-
defaulting party of any obligation to make payments or declare an Early 
Termination Date.186  The First Method allows the non-defaulting party to 
walk away from the agreement, since they have no obligation to repay the 
defaulting party if they are owed money after electing an Early Termination 
Date.187  The Second Method disallows the non-defaulting party to walk 
away by requiring that either party pay the net amount owed when the 
transactions are closed out.188  Unless Enron Australia’s liquidators were 
entitled to recover funds under the Additional Termination Event,189 they 
would never collect on the amounts owed under the Swap Agreement.  This 
is also due to the fact that the Master Agreement has no termination date 
itself, and thus the flawed asset provision operates indefinitely to prevent the 
payment obligation of the non-defaulting party from arising.  This 
effectively turns an election of the Second Method—an election that 
purports to disallow parties to walk away when they are found to have an 
obligation in the event of an early termination—into an election of the First 
Method, where the defaulting party has no hope of ever making a successful 
recovery.  
The New South Wales Court of Appeals’ decision exposed a 
substantial term of the Master Agreement as an ineffective, illogical, and 
inefficient flaw 190  that created a forced option for the liquidator of the 
defaulting party to either disclaim the contract as a whole,191 or to extend the 
liquidation proceedings for the sole purpose of potentially realizing the value 
                                           
186
  See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the choice of methods for determining payment in the 
event of default under the Agreement).  
187
  See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(e)(i).  
188
  See id. 
189
  See discussion supra part V.A.  
190
  Even in the event that Enron Australia is entitled to payment upon the termination of all of the 
underlying transactions, the term still operates to draw out a contract that is not productive on anyone’s 
account.  See discussion supra Part V.A. 
191
  See supra Part III.C.  
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of the contract at the termination of the attendant transactions.192  End users 
of the Master Agreement have a strong interest in predictability of the 
outcome of an event governed by the terms of a contract.193  Model contracts 
from third parties, like statutes, should be efficiently drafted using clear 
language, and thus render predictable outcomes.194  The Enron Australia 
decision causes the Master Agreement to fail the ISDA’s objective by 
rendering the Second Method superfluous.  
Swap arrangements documented by the Master Agreement are often 
used to hedge a company’s interest in a particular market,195 and thus allow 
the party to lower the risk of loss incurred in a sudden downturn in the 
market or other financially tumultuous event.196  By using a swap agreement 
as a hedging tool, the parties and their creditors reasonably expect that, in 
the event of potential financial failure, the hedging party will have the 
benefit of the hedge contract to offset some of the losses incurred.197 
Prior to January 1, 2005, swaps were often carried off balance sheets, 
only recognized by a note to the financial statement.198  Smaller creditors of 
Enron Australia may not have known of the swap contracts under the Master 
Agreement.  These parties would normally bear the risk of debtor 
insolvency.  Enron Australia’s larger creditors may have been aware of, and 
                                           
192
  This is precisely what the liquidator of Enron Australia was attempting to do.  Enron Austl. Fin. 
Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266.  
193
  See discussion infra Part V.C.  
194
  This is particularly true for the ISDA, as one of its chief goals is to promote efficiency through 
their documentation.  ISDA Mission, supra note 18. 
195
  The use of swaps to hedge against risks in the markets of certain commodities such as electricity 
are referred to as commodity swaps.  KOLB, supra note 30, at 702-03.  Derivative instruments are no longer 
purely hedging instruments, and many investors now actively enter them as profit seeking investment and 
financing devices.  This may have been the case for Enron Australia.  Cf. Quilkey Interview, supra note 
129 (discussing the investing practices of Enron in the electricity market).  In such an event, the 
significance here of having the contract as an asset available in liquidation is increased.  See discussion 
infra note 197.  
196
  CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 650 (11th ed. 2006).  
197
  If there is expectation that the investment will create an asset for financing purposes, then there is 
even more expectation on the part of the creditors that it would be available in the event of the party’s 
insolvency and/or liquidation.  There, it would not be used as a hedge against a particular risk of Enron 
Australia, but would be a financing asset with an expected realizable value.  
198
  See IAS PLUS, STANDARDS: IAS 39, http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm (showing the 
history and amendment of IAS 39).  This was likely the case for Enron Australia.  Note that this was also 
what got Enron into trouble in the first place – hiding related party transactions off the balance sheet. Floyd 
Norris, Accounting Rules Changed to Bar Tactics Used by Enron, N.Y. TIMES, January 16, 2003, at C4.  In 
the United States, similar changes for derivative and hedge accounting have already gone into effect.  See 
generally, FINANCIAL ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 
149 (2003) (amending Statement 133 so as to limit the instances when hedge accounting can be used, and 
emphasizing disclosure and recognition of derivatives on the balance sheet), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas149.pdf. 
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given access to, the derivative documentation.  If that were the case, those 
creditors should not have relied on the benefits of the Master Agreement in 
the event of Enron Australia’s insolvency when deciding to extend credit.199 
Under the revised International Accounting Standard 39 (“IAS 39”), 
smaller creditors may improperly rely on the accounting for ISDA swap 
agreements.200  On January 1, 2005, the amendments to IAS 39 went into 
effect.201  Companies are now required to carry derivative contracts at their 
fair value on the balance sheet. 202   Under these new standards, Enron 
Australia would have carried the Master Agreement as a positive asset on the 
balance sheet, though it was not realizable in liquidation.  Creditors and the 
investing public, who only have the financial statements to rely on, have 
even more potential for unexpectedly bearing the risk of insolvency under 
the amended standard.  Creditors likely consider the existence of the swap 
agreement with a positive value on the balance sheet when deciding whether 
to extend credit.203  When parties cannot properly rely on assets carried on 
the financial statements, the integrity of the financial statements becomes 
less reliable.  
The Master Agreement operates against the general expectations and 
purpose of the ISDA where the in-the-money party is insolvent to provide a 
stable and predictable swap contract.  Enron Australia’s creditors most likely 
reasonably expected that the benefits of the hedge contract would be 
available to offset the losses suffered as a result of its insolvency and 
subsequent liquidation.  This is evidenced by the fact that this potential 
ability for nonpayment is just now being recognized and enforced after years 
of the Master Agreement’s use.204  Now that this operation in the Master 
Agreement is exposed, parties to existing agreements are likely to enforce 
this outcome more often.205  Of course, hedge contracts are usually designed 
to protect the party against the risk incurred because of unexpected 
                                           
199
  See infra Part VI.A. 
200
  See IAS PLUS, STANDARDS: IAS 39, supra note 198.  
201
  Id.  
202
 INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS BD., IAS 39:FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION AND 
MEASUREMENT, http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/documents/8_63_ias39-sum.pdf.  Fair value refers to 
the price of the underlying item to the derivative instrument on the market on the date the balance sheet is 
prepared.  Id.  To the extent that they are classified as an effective cash-flow hedge, the change in value is 
held in a separate equity account until the gain or loss is realized through payment or sale.  Id. 
203
  The issue is thus raised as to what extent this is the most accurate accounting method for an 
agreement entered into under the 1992 Master Agreement, as it may not actually be available as an asset in 
the event of the in-the-money party’s insolvency.  See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 416.  
204
  Denis M. Forster, Defusing the Time Bomb Exposed by Enron Australia v. TXU, 25 No. 3 
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2005).  
205
  See id. at 5 n. 21. 
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fluctuations in the market of the commodity that is the subject of the swap 
agreement,206 as opposed to the general financial risk of the contracting 
company.  The creditors nonetheless may rely on the accounting for the 
swap agreement as an asset on the balance sheet when determining whether 
to extend credit.  
C. The Walk-Away Provision‘s Shifting of Risk Presents a Real Concern.  
Both the party entering into a swap contract and that party’s creditors 
expect that a swap agreement will operate as a hedging tool.207  Creditors 
take a particular interest in a borrowing company’s credit exposure. 208  
Derivative transactions in particular may be seen as potential assets available 
in the event the debtor becomes insolvent or is otherwise unable to meet its 
obligation. 209   When the benefit of the swap contract is unexpectedly 
unavailable for the creditors’ benefit, as was the case for the creditors of 
Enron Australia, the risk of loss under the swap agreement is shifted from 
the two contracting parties to the creditors of the defaulting party. 
If the creditors had the opportunity to give the swap agreement a close 
vetting, and were in fact familiar with the terms of the Master Agreement, 
then arguably the creditors themselves, as sophisticated parties, rightly bear 
the risk of Enron’s default under the Master Agreement.210  It is likely that 
most creditors reasonably relied on the characterization of the swap contract 
in the financial statement notes, and had reason to believe that the amount 
owed would become due in the event of liquidation.211  Enron Australia’s 
creditors thus bore an unexpected risk under the Master Agreement.212  
                                           
206
  See generally STICKNEY & WEIL, supra note 196, at 489-91 (discussing basic accounting of 
hedges).  In the case of Enron Australia and TXU’s arrangement, the value of the swap agreement was tied 
to the price of electricity.  Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, 
para. 6.  
207
  See discussion supra Part V.B.  To the extent that the Swap Contract appears as a positive asset on 
the debtor’s balance sheet, the creditors are presumed to reasonably rely on that asset in their decisions as 
to whether, and on what terms, to extend credit to the debtor.  
208
  See Waldman, supra note 14, at 1049 (noting that the credit risk of parties to swap agreements is 
especially of concern in the event of parties to OTC derivative transactions).  
209
  See Bergman, et al., supra note 14, at 16 (stating that in the event of a bank’s insolvency and a net 
in-the-money position under a swap agreement, the termination payment would be an asset of the insolvent 
bank available for the depositors thereof); supra Part V.B. 
210
  Whether Enron Australia, as a sophisticated party to the contract, should itself be responsible for 
the understanding of the operation of the 1992 Master Agreement in the event of its liquidation, and the 
appropriateness of accounting for the swap contract, are issues additionally raised by the outcome of this 
case. 
211
  See supra Part V.B. 
212
  Enron Australia itself bore some responsibility to understand the effect of insolvency on the swap 
contract, and to thereby communicate the potential outcome in the notes accompanying its financial 
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This unexpected shifting of the loss has potentially serious 
consequences in the marketplace, as creditors are unable to consider the 
potential inability to collect during insolvency at the time that they extended 
credit to the debtor.  The fact that the benefits of the contract would not be 
available might realistically affect either the terms attached to the credit 
extended,213 or whether credit should be extended in the first place.  This is 
another example under the Master Agreement where the actual outcome 
does not conform to the expected result, thus demonstrating that the 
compromised predictability and clarity of the Agreement has second-order 
consequences.  
This unanticipated transfer of risk to the creditors of the defaulting 
party gives rise to concerns for the potential of systemic risk. 214   By 
transferring the risk of loss outside of the immediate contractual relationship, 
the level of risk is less likely to be subject to quantitative measurement, thus 
hampering the ability of the parties to assess and accommodate their 
exposure.  As a result, the default of an in-the-money party under a swap 
agreement governed by the Master Agreement215 could prevent owed funds 
from being available to pay the obligations under another swap contract and 
shift the risk to a third party.  The third party might become insolvent as a 
result of this lost asset.  This could subject the creditors of the third party to 
the similar disappointed expectations as a result of the Master Agreement, 
thus creating a domino effect of risk transfer and default.  While this 
doomsday scenario is remote,216 the consequences of the potential risks are 
indeed tangible.217  
                                                                                                                              
statements.  This raises the more general question of to what extent, if any, third party drafters of contracts 
should be liable for adverse outcomes under their model contract.  See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
213
 Examples include: the interest rate attached to the debt, other payment terms such as the time for 
repayment, required principal payments, etc.  It is enough to consider here that these terms would be 
considered and affected by the level of risk that the creditor deems associated with a particular debtor, as 
well as the availability (or absence) of certain assets, when determining the overall level of risk attached to 
the debtor.  
214
  Walker & Usher, supra note 7.  In the event that there is a fairly enclosed market, with a set 
number of participants engaged in an inter-related web of derivative contracts, the transfer of risk has the 
potential to create a domino effect of risk and loss transfer, which is systemic risk.  See Bergman et al., 
supra note 14, at 30. 
215
  Where the insolvent party is unable to collect under the agreement in circumstances similar to 
those in Enron Australia. See supra Part IV. 
216
  See generally Craig H. Furfine, Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion, J. 
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING, Vol. 35, No. 1, Feb. 2003, at 111 (concluding that the systemic failure of 
banks is generally unlikely).  
217
  See Waldman, supra note 14, at 1056-57 (recognizing that although unlikely, it is easy to envision 
a chain-reaction of defaults, illiquidity of the derivatives, and panicked-driven selling). 
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Market practitioners recognized the particular risks to regulated 
financial institutions that engage in credit derivative swaps under the Master 
Agreement regarding netting and capital adequacy requirements.218  Whether 
the operation of the provisions as demonstrated by the Enron Australia case 
is significant enough to affect regulation of financial institutions is not yet 
clear.219  However, this parallels concerns about the proper accounting for 
swap contracts with regard to the disclosure and valuation of assets, and the 
risks of recognizing those assets upon liquidation. 
Beyond the complete collapse of a local market, the increased and 
uncertain risk may create certain compensatory upward adjustments.  For 
example, the benefit of swap agreements as a potential asset will be limited.  
Credit will be extended more conservatively, and applicable rates will 
increase as a result of the increased risk borne by those extending credit to 
parties engaged in transactions under the Master Agreement.  The higher 
cost of credit to companies engaging in the sale of a commodity could result 
in the overall increase of prices for the underlying commodity itself, which 
elicits a greater social interest for the impact on end-consumer markets.  
VI. THE ISDA SHOULD RESPOND TO THE CONCERNS OF THE MARKET AND 
FULFILL ITS SELF-PROCLAIMED GOALS  
The outcome of the Enron Australia decision triggered a rapid 
response across globe from practitioners who work with swaps and 
derivatives instruments. 220   The private market has proven its ability to 
recognize, respond, analyze, and adjust to new and unexpected outcomes in 
light of this case.  The very ability of the private market to be this aware and 
responsive may itself be sufficient for users of the Master Agreement to 
consider the potential effect exposed by the Enron Australia decision.  
Future negotiation of swap and derivative agreements memorialized by the 
Master Agreements will include a deeper consideration of the insolvency of 
an in-the-money party. 
Although market participants were initially reactive, the outcome of 
the Enron Australia decision must be addressed by the ISDA in order to 
protect against the Master Agreement operating in a similar fashion without 
prior consideration by the contracting parties.  The ISDA has an ethical 
obligation, if not a legal one, to ensure that the outcomes under its model 
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agreements are foreseeable and that the provisions operate without 
subversive interactions.  The ability of the private market to be flexible in 
adapting to new circumstances is a powerful one, and no legislation is 
required to resolve this situation. 
A. Private Market Participants and the ISDA Are Best Equipped to 
Address the Operation of the Master Agreement.  
The private markets in local and international swap and derivative 
practice have shown an expeditious and reactive ability in response to the 
outcome of the Enron Australia decision. 221   Some of the reaction has 
extended beyond the private rule makers to governmental inquiries.222  The 
private market participants and private market regulators, such as the ISDA, 
are best equipped to efficiently address the interaction of the terms of the 
Master Agreement exposed by the Enron Australia decision.  Enron 
Australia’s liquidation has brought the interplay of the flawed asset 
provision and the right of the non-defaulting party not to elect an early 
termination date to the attention of the swap and derivative market 
participants.  Thus, the parties to such agreements will recognize the 
operation of the Master Agreement to provide a windfall to a non-defaulting 
party to the expense of the creditors of the defaulted party.  It is likely that 
both parties will consider the importance of the contract with regard to the 
price and obtainment of credit,223 and will give sufficient weight to how the 
swaps are accounted for and disclosed to creditors.  The availability of the 
contract in the event of financial turmoil of the company might well be 
important enough to induce parties to contract around the outcome of the 
Enron Australia decision.  Currently, however, there are many open 
contracts entered into under the 1992 Master Agreement.224  Counterparties 
to insolvent in-the-money parties will now try to enforce the contracts as 
written to avoid payment, similar to TXU.225  In order to minimize the 
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potential risks from this behavior,226 the ISDA should amend the Master 
Agreement to prevent this subversive operation for future transactions.   
B. The ISDA Is Obligated to Consider Another Option.  
The ISDA, as a third-party drafter, has an ethical obligation to 
maintain predictability and explicit operation of the model agreements.  The 
parties that use the Model Agreements to enter into derivative contracts are 
generally sophisticated.227  Thus, parties should have the ability to vet the 
model agreement in utilizing the agreements as contracts.  However, the 
ISDA has, by the very nature of the organization, taken on a role of fostering 
and maintaining systemic stability.228  While there may be no legal liability 
of the ISDA to address the operation of the Master Agreement in this 
instance, the ISDA has a professional and ethical responsibility to the market 
and its participants to provide a contract that operates as each of the 
available options purport to on their face.  This can easily be accomplished 
by altering the model agreement.  
The ISDA has indicated that the outcome of the Enron Australia 
decision is desirable, and even expected.229   However, the question still 
remains as to why the Master Agreement would purport to allow for the 
choice of the Second Method, when there are subversive situations where 
the terms of the Agreement operate to render it all but ineffective.230  The 
ISDA released the 2002 version of the Master Agreement in order to update 
the agreement to current market practices.231  The ISDA removed the First 
Method, which allowed for a non-defaulting party to walk away from any 
obligation to the defaulting party as an available option under the contract.232  
This indicates a clear intention to move away from allowing a party to walk 
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away from the agreement.  By leaving the interaction of the flawed asset 
provision with the Second Method unaddressed, however, the ISDA 
continues to allow for the effects of the First Method to remain in the event 
of factual circumstances similar to those of Enron Australia.233  
In order to put the effects of the First Method election properly to rest, 
the ISDA should adopt a compulsory termination date, with a flexible 
amount of time for parties to determine whether such an election is prudent. 
This will give greater transparency to the potential outcomes under the 
contract, allow greater certainty to the parties as to what they are bargaining 
for, and protect unknowing parties from an inequitable outcome such as that 
in Enron Australia.   
A practical alternative to current the Master Agreement, which will rid 
the agreement of the lingering ability of a party to walk away from its 
obligation under the contract, can be found by looking to another derivative 
instrument.  The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) has a model contract for use 
in utilities markets.234  The EEI Master Contract avoids the potential for the 
non-defaulting party to be able to walk away from its obligation. The EEI 
allows for the suspension of payments for ten business days upon an event of 
default, and provides the non-defaulting party the option to declare an early 
termination date during the period of suspended payment.235  Thus, there is 
some flexibility for the non-defaulting party, while providing certainty that 
the contract will expire at some point in time.  
Currently, under the ISDA Master Agreement, the only other option 
open to the parties is to elect for an Automatic Termination Date to apply.236  
The option put forth by the EEI suggests that there can be a balance of 
certainty and flexibility.  While the length of time could certainly be variable 
and negotiated between the parties to the agreement, it would provide a 
greater certainty to the fate of the parties under the agreement, and greater 
confidence to the creditors of the respective parties that the benefit of the 
agreement will be available in the event of insolvency or liquidation.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Enron Australia decision exposed an inconsistency in the 1992 
ISDA Master Agreement.  It also showed how quickly market participants 
are capable of reacting to the unexpected operations of the Master 
Agreement’s provisions.  The market’s ability to identify problems under the 
agreement should be harnessed to improve the Master Agreement’s terms.  
Greater transparency of the effect of the flawed asset provision and the 
election of the Second Method will provide predictable outcomes consistent 
with the expectation of the parties to the agreement.  Thus, the parties will 
be able to negotiate for outcomes that correspond to their underlying 
interests with particular regard to the terms and cost of financing.  
Furthermore, by providing for terms with greater certainty in the Master 
Agreement, the risks to third parties can be contained, and the potential for 
systemic risk kept at a minimum.  
When a regulatory responsibility is taken up by a private organization 
such as the ISDA, there exists a responsibility on the part of the organization 
to the end users of the model forms to provide documentation that is in line 
with their leading role in the development of privately negotiated derivative 
instruments.  In light of this responsibility, it is necessary for the ISDA to 
address the compromised clarity and purpose of the contract by 1) giving 
notice to the parties in the marketplace so that they can contract around the 
provisions, and 2) amending the provisions in the Master Agreement so that 
the default rules will avoid giving rise to the unexpected outcome, thereby 
making the risk more ascertainable and addressable.  
Additional concerns remain.  Most importantly, accounting authorities 
must elucidate the appropriate accounting for the swap agreements.  
Otherwise, reliance arguments and allegations of misleading accountings are 
likely to be raised and litigated.  Also, financial regulatory authorities must 
clarify whether financial institutions and capital adequacy requirements are 
affected by this case.  Finally, it is necessary to consider the accountability 
of organizations that take on a role of responsibility in the promotion and 
fostering of markets.  Sophisticated market practitioners and participants 
must rely on their own instincts and analysis to catch the next volatile 
reaction before it happens.  
